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Identification of Potential Economic Impacts of President Bush’s
National Energy Policy and Kyoto Follow-up on West Virginia
Final Report
Executive Summary
This report presents the results of attempts to measure the impacts of recently
proposed policies on the West Virginia economy. Specifically, we examine the Kyoto
Protocol, the May 2001 report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, and
the February 2002 Global Climate Change Policy Book which explains the Bush
Administration’s approach to limiting greenhouse gas emissions. We find that in some
cases the potential effects of the policies outlined in these initiatives are large because of
potential impacts on U.S. gross domestic product and potential impacts on the use of coal
in electricity generation.
In the last year and one half, there have been many significant actions dealing
with global climate change and energy policy. In March 2001, President Bush
announced that the U.S. would not proceed toward ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. In
spite of the U.S. action, the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol met in July
2001 and again in October and November 2001. The parties reached an agreement that
may lead to eventual ratification of the Protocol by nations other than the U.S. On May
16, 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney delivered to President Bush the Report of the
National Energy Policy Development Group entitled “Reliable, Affordable, and
Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future.” The Report describes a long-run
strategy emphasizing advanced technology to provide the nation both reliable energy and
a clean environment.
West Virginia’s economy is more concentrated than the economies of most states
in the production and use of energy. West Virginia exports to other states about 70
percent of its electricity production and over 80 percent of its coal production. West
Virginia also produces and consumes large amounts of natural gas. Thus, many of the
above-described efforts to deal with global climate change and energy policy could have
substantial and wide-ranging impacts on West Virginia’s coal and electricity industries
and other parts of the West Virginia economy.
In this report, we use the REMI model to estimate potential impacts of these
policies on the West Virginia economy. The REMI model is a structural model of the
U.S. economy which can be disaggregated to state or regional levels. We use REMI’s
default “Control Forecast” of economic variables such as Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), employment, and many other variables to generate our baseline forecast. This
baseline forecast covers the period 2000 through 2025 based on actual data through 1999.
We then replace values of policy variables likely to be affected by the Kyoto Protocol or
U.S. federal energy and environmental policies and calculate alternative forecasts based
on these new values of the policy variables. The difference between the baseline forecast
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and each alternative forecast is the estimated impact of the implementation of the
Protocol or federal policy.
We find that the Kyoto Protocol as it currently stands is unlikely to have large
impacts on West Virginia. The U.S. will not be participating in the emissions reductions
or the mechanisms of the Protocol, and the requirements on other nations to implement
the Protocol have been substantially diluted in recent negotiations. We model the impact
of Europe’s implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on West Virginia by making two
alternative assumptions about reductions in West Virginia’s coal exports to Europe. The
first alternative assumes a 10 percent reduction in West Virginia’s coal exports to Europe,
while the second assumes a reduction of 50 percent. The impacts for the 10 percent
alternative are quite small. For West Virginia, the REMI model predicts that by 2010 the
impacts of the 50 percent reduction scenario relative to the baseline forecast are an annual
loss of real Gross State Product of $60 million and an employment loss of 1,000. Thus,
continued implementation of the Protocol in Europe may have only very limited impacts
on the West Virginia economy.
We find that the policies outlined in the report of the National Energy Policy
Development Group (NEP) could have small positive impacts on West Virginia. This
results from the forecast positive effect on the nation’s GDP and the increase in the
demand for coal in electricity production in the near term, which increases income and
production in West Virginia. Thus, we see that the NEP scenario has small positive
impacts on the West Virginia economy. The direct impacts occur in mining output,
electricity prices, and U.S. GDP. These impacts are spread throughout the state’s
economy as sales of intermediate products and services increase and as employment and
incomes rise. As a result, there are also positive effects on construction, services, retail
trade, and other sectors. The NEP Report also includes recommendations on federal
spending that would affect the West Virginia economy, including a recommendation for
$2 billion over ten years in additional spending on research on clean coal technology.
We model the impact of the NEP both with and without the additional spending. The
REMI model predicts that by 2010 the results for West Virginia of the NEP’s changes
with the additional spending relative to the baseline forecast are an annual gain of real
Gross State Product of $205 million and a gain of total employment of 4,760. Real
output across a wide range of sectors of the West Virginia economy are also higher. In
the earlier years, mining output and employment are higher with the NEP scenario, but
they are moderately lower by 2015 and beyond. The NEP scenario raises real gross state
product and total employment over the entire period.
We determine that the Bush Administration’s climate change policies could have
negative effects on income and production in West Virginia. The 1998 Energy
Information Administration (EIA) study of the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on the U.S.
economy estimated the impacts of various policy regimes on supply and demand in U.S.
energy markets. The EIA study included, among others, policy scenarios for U.S. carbon
emissions levels at 1990 levels plus 24 percent. This scenario is useful in estimating the
effects of the Bush administration’s alternative approach to controlling greenhouse gas
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emissions, because the Bush plan is approximately one-half as stringent as the 1990+24%
scenario. Thus, the EIA’s 1990+24% scenario gives us a scenario with pre-calculated,
detailed impacts on energy markets and macroeconomic variables and a known
relationship to the Bush administration’s plan. The REMI model predicts for the
1990+24% scenario that by 2010 there would be an annual loss of real GSP of $1.674
billion, a loss of total employment of 30,370, and a loss in real personal income of
almost $1 billion. Thus, Bush administration’s plan announced in February 2002 would
have negative impacts of one-half or less of the impacts for the 1990+24% scenario. The
negative impacts could be substantially smaller.

Identification of Potential Economic Impacts of President Bush’s
National Energy Policy and Kyoto Follow-up on West Virginia

Final Report

1. Introduction
During 2001 we saw a great deal of activity on policies concerning energy and the
environment. Globally, signatories to the Kyoto Protocol vigorously worked to finalize
policies and procedures to implement the Protocol, so that it could enter into force as
soon as possible. The George W. Bush administration took office in Washington early in
2001, and immediately began to pursue new energy and environment policy directions. It
swiftly repudiated the Kyoto Protocol as excessively costly to the U.S. and ineffective by
its failure to constrain the greenhouse gas emissions of China, India, and other large
countries. The Bush Administration pursued a comprehensive reexamination of U.S.
energy policy, leading to the release in May 2001 of a report of the National Energy
Policy Development Group entitled “Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound
Energy for America’s Future.” The report described a long-run strategy to provide the
nation both reliable energy and a clean environment. Early in 2002, the Bush
Administration revealed its approach to limiting greenhouse gas emissions as an
alternative to the Kyoto Protocol. The Bush Administration’s immediate goal for its
global climate change initiative would not be reducing emissions but rather reducing
“emissions intensity,” or emissions per unit of the economy’s output. The rationale for
this shift in emphasis in near-term goals is that the nation’s economy must continue to
grow, because economic growth allows increased investments in clean energy
technologies and conservation. The President’s initiative emphasizes research, tax
incentives, and other voluntary measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
All of these activities are particularly important in West Virginia because of our
state’s unusually large dependence on energy production and use. Unlike most other
states, West Virginia exports the majority of its electricity production and its coal
production to other states. This report presents the results of our attempts to measure the
impacts of these proposed policies on the West Virginia economy. We find that in some
cases the potential effects are large because of potential impacts on U.S. gross domestic
product and potential impacts on the use of coal in electricity generation.
2. The Kyoto Protocol and Follow-up Activities to Implement the Protocol
Scientists and others have long recognized the potential for anthropogenic
changes to the global climate. To deal with potential threats from anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions, diplomats meeting at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro

Final Report

2

signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). By
June 1993, 166 nations had signed the Convention, and it entered into force on March 21,
1994. (http://unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html)
The First Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, meeting in
Berlin in 1995, concluded that Article 4 of the Convention, regarding the commitment of
developed countries to limit greenhouse gas emissions and to protect greenhouse gas
sinks, was inadequate. It agreed to take action to reduce emissions during the period
following 2000 through a protocol to the Convention. This agreement for further action
was known as the “Berlin Mandate.” (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf)
The resulting action was the Kyoto Protocol, adopted at the Third Session of the
Conference of the Parties, which met in Kyoto in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol included
specific commitments by developed nations to reduce overall emissions of greenhouse
gases to at least 5 percent below 1990 levels for the period 2008 to 2012. The emissions
limitation commitment by the United States was for an emissions level at 93 percent of
its 1990 emissions level. (http://unfccc.int/ resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf)
The Fourth Session of the Conference of Parties was held from November 2
through 14, 1998, in Buenos Aires, Argentina. During this meeting the Conference
adopted the “Buenos Aires Plan of Action” (BAPA). (FCCC/CP/1998/ 16/Add. 1) The
BAPA included decisions on a variety of issues needed to implement the Kyoto Protocol.
Most importantly, the BAPA established a work program on the clean development
mechanism (CDM), the joint implementation mechanism, and the emissions trading
mechanism, including deciding on the nature of the mechanisms, the supplementarity of
the mechanisms to domestic actions, the institutional framework, and compliance. Under
the BAPA, the most important of these activities was to be completed at the Sixth Session
of the Conference of the Parties to be held in 2000. The Fifth Session of the Conference
of Parties, held from October 25 through November 5, 1999, in Bonn, Germany, dealt
primarily with technical issues.
The sixth Conference of the Parties (COP 6) convened at The Hague,
Netherlands, on November 13, 2000. Its goal was to implement the Buenos Aires Plan of
Action (BAPA) adopted at COP 4 in 1998. The Hague meeting, however, failed to reach
an agreement on implementation of the BAPA. (FCCC/CP/2000/5) The major areas of
disagreement were funding mechanisms for the Global Environment Facility,
operational details of the mechanisms, land-use, land-use change, and forestry, and
compliance. Rather than end the sixth session of the COP without agreement, the
delegates agreed to suspend the sixth session and to resume it in 2001.
The sixth session resumed in Bonn on July 6, 2001. (See Kreft and Greenstreet,
2001, for a complete analysis of the Sixth Session of the Conference of the Parties.) The
delegates resolved or deferred the problems encountered at The Hague and approved
“The Bonn Agreements on the implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action.” The
important features of The Bonn Agreement are the following (FCCC/CP/2001/5):
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establishes and funds a climate change fund under the UNFCCC to complement
the GEF;
establishes an adaptation fund under the Kyoto Protocol which will finance
adaptation projects in developing countries (The fund will be financed from
CDM proceeds);
agrees that parties will phase out imperfections and subsidies to greenhouse gas
emitting sectors and cooperate in developing non-energy uses of fossil fuels and
advanced fossil fuel technologies, including capture and storage of greenhouse
gases;
agrees that domestic action will constitute “a significant element of the effort”
made by each Annex I party to meet its emissions reductions commitments;
agrees that Annex I parties will not use emission reductions generated through
nuclear facilities to meet their emissions reductions commitments through
emissions trading or the clean development mechanism;
agrees that afforestation and reforestation will be the only types of LULUCF
projects used under the CDM during the first commitment period;
agrees on various aspects of accounting for LULUCF;
agrees on various mechanisms and procedures related to compliance with the
terms of the Kyoto Protocol.

The Bonn agreement left many important issues unresolved, referring them to the
seventh Conference of Parties, held in Marrakech in 2001. The seventh Conference of
the Parties (COP 7) convened at Marrakech, Morocco, on October 29, 2001. Its goal was
to finalize the details of the agreement to implement the Kyoto Protocol reached at Bonn
in COP 6. The conference ratified the basic decisions reached at Bonn and concluded
difficult negotiations on the outstanding issues related to compliance, reporting of data,
assigned credits for forest sinks, and operations of the mechanisms. This prepared the
way for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force upon ratification by enough parties. (See
Reece and Childs, 2001, for further details of the recent activities implementing the
Kyoto Protocol.)
The bargaining process in Bonn and Marrakech, however, resulted in a substantial
weakening of the Protocol. According to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, the members of
the “Umbrella Group” remaining after the departure of the U.S. used their enhanced
position to weaken requirements impacting them:
In the knowledge that their participation was essential for entry into
force of the Protocol, the Russian Federation, Japan, Australia, and
Canada used this leverage—both collectively and individually—to drive
down the “price” of ratification. … [T]hey sought to weaken the
compliance system, lower the eligibility requirements for mechanisms,
undermine opportunities for public participation and transparency, and
minimize requirements for providing information on sinks.
(International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2001b, p. 15)
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Russia succeeded in almost doubling its allowance for forest sinks, and Japan succeeded
in getting compliance terms it sought.
In spite of, and perhaps because of, the withdrawal of the support of the United
States, the other parties to the Kyoto Protocol reached compromise agreements on the
terms for implementing the Protocol at their meetings in Bonn and Marrakech.
(According to Claussen, 2001, p. 3, “… some have suggested that the U.S. government’s
repudiation of the Kyoto accord actually saved the Protocol from a harsher fate.”) The
terms of the agreement are, however, much more lenient than originally envisioned.
According to the Environmental News Network, the Bonn compromises “… will mean
that the global cut in emissions is only about a third of the original goal of reducing
greenhouse gas production by the 30-odd most industrial nations to an average of 5.2
percent below their 1990 levels by 2012.” (Environmental News Network, 2001)
According to the BBC News, “… the Bonn compromise is a marked retreat from the
modest step the world had been planning to take …” (BBC News 2001a)
Thus, the proposed implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will have much smaller
effects than it would have had if it had been implemented as originally planned. First, the
United States will not ratify the Protocol and will not participate in its emissions
reductions and mechanisms. Second, Japan has expressed its reservations about
compliance with the Protocol, and indeed BBC News has reported that Japan may
abandon mandatory emissions restrictions so that it may not meet the reductions specified
in the Protocol. (BBC News 2002) Third, use of forests and farmland as carbon sinks
has been liberalized, so that the emissions reductions will be smaller than originally
planned. (BBC News 2001b)

3. The National Energy Policy Development Group Report
While the Kyoto Protocol implementation process was underway, the Bush
administration was proceeding on a variety of activities related to energy and the
environment. One of the most important of these activities was the development of a
comprehensive plan for U.S. energy policy. On May 16, 2001, Vice President Dick
Cheney delivered to President Bush the Report of the National Energy Policy
Development Group (NEP) entitled “Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound
Energy for America’s Future.” The Report describes a long-run strategy emphasizing
advanced technology to provide the nation both reliable energy and a clean environment.
The Report consists of eight chapters covering energy challenges facing the United
States, energy and the environment, conservation, energy supply, and energy delivery,
among other topics. The focus of the Report is on a “fundamental imbalance” between
energy supply and energy demand in the U.S. The imbalance will be addressed by
meeting three challenges:
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Promoting energy conservation;
Repairing and modernizing the nation’s energy infrastructure, which includes
electric generating plants, transmission lines, pipelines, and refineries;
Increasing the nation’s energy supplies while protecting and improving the
environment.

The NEP Report includes many widely ranging policy proposals to meet these
challenges—the Report’s Summary of Recommendations includes 105 items. (See
Reece, 2001, for further details of the NEP Report and its recommendations, particularly
those likely to affect West Virginia.)
West Virginia’s economy is more concentrated than the economies of most states
in the production and use of energy. West Virginia exports to other states about 70
percent of its electricity production and over 80 percent of its coal production. West
Virginia also produces and consumes natural gas. (Greenstreet, 1999, p. 1) Thus, federal
energy policies such as those outlined in the NEP Report could have substantial impacts
on West Virginia. The Report projects that demand for electricity in the U.S. will grow
by 45 percent over the next 20 years and that meeting that demand will require
construction of 1,300 to 1,900 new electric power plants. The study notes that recent new
power plants have been fueled by natural gas and that nuclear power may become
important for this expanded electricity supply. But it also notes the substantial supplies
of coal available in the U.S. and emphasizes that research into clean coal technologies
may lead to adoption of coal as the fuel to power some of these new electricity generation
plants.
The Report recognizes the important role played by coal in providing the primary
energy source for electricity production in the U.S. and forecasts that this low-cost energy
source will remain important to the U.S. economy for decades to come. The Report
recommends policies to promote the growth of the coal-fired electric utility industry
while reducing undesirable emissions. These policies are likely to have the greatest
impacts on West Virginia. The primary policies affecting the coal industry are the
following:
•
•
•
•

investing $2 billion over 10 years to fund research in clean coal technologies;
supporting a permanent extension of the existing clean coal research and
development tax credit;
directing agencies to investigate regulatory approaches that will encourage
advancements in clean coal environmental technology;
directing federal agencies to provide greater regulatory certainty to coal electricity
generators through clear policies, including new multi-pollutant regulation and
clarification of new source review regulations and enforcement.

Final Report

6

Thus, it is clear that these energy policy proposals can have substantial impacts on West
Virginia’s coal and electricity industries as well as other parts of the West Virginia
economy.

4. The U.S. Government’s Kyoto Protocol Follow-up
The U.S. has withdrawn its support for the Kyoto Protocol. On March 13, 2001,
President Bush wrote a letter to four U.S. senators in which he expressed his opposition
to the Kyoto Protocol and signaled the withdrawal of U.S. support for its ratification:
As you know, I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent
of the world, including major population centers such as China and India,
from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy.
The Senate’s vote, 95-0, shows that there is a clear consensus that the
Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global
climate change concerns.
While President Bush clearly indicated that the U.S. no longer supported the Protocol,
U.S. representatives continued to participate in the international meetings related to the
Protocol. The U.S. continued to express support for efforts of some kind to limit
greenhouse gas emissions and global climate change.
President Bush’s Cabinet-level working group on global climate change in May
2001 asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) for an update on the current state
of knowledge in climate-change science. The White House group was particularly
interested in finding out where the conclusions of the science of climate change were
most certain and where they were most uncertain. It also asked the NAS to report on
whether there were any important differences between the reports of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the summaries of those reports.
The NAS reviewed the reports and summaries of IPCC Working Group I, which deals
with the science of climate change. The NAS reported on June 6, 2001. It concluded that
“Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human
activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise.”
(NAS, p. 1) The NAS advised that the full report of Working Group I was an “admirable
summary of research activities in climate science” and that the Technical Summary
“adequately” summarized the full report. (p. 4) It concluded that the Summary for
Policymakers contained less emphasis on the uncertainties in the science and more
emphasis on concerns with human–induced climate change. While the NAS report
examined in detail various aspects of the uncertainties in the science of climate change, it
summarized as follows:
Because there is considerable uncertainty in the current understanding of
how the climate system varies naturally and reacts to emissions of

Final Report

7

greenhouse gases and aerosols, current estimates of the magnitude of future
warming should be regarded as tentative and subject to future adjustments
(either upward or downward). (NAS, p. 1)
On June 11, 2001, President Bush made a major announcement concerning his
administration’s actions addressing global climate change. (Bush, 2001b) He reaffirmed
his view that the Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed, while pledging the U.S. to work with
other nations to respond effectively to the problem of global climate change. The
President set out six basic principles to guide his administration’s actions. These actions
must do the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

meet the long-term goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations
be “measured” or appropriate for the state of climate science
be flexible to take advantage of new information and new technology
ensure continued economic growth in the U.S. and elsewhere
incorporate market-based incentives and spur technical innovation
include global participation

President Bush proposed two new research initiatives. The U.S. Climate Change
Research Initiative will fund federal government actions to advance climate-change
science. The National Climate Change Technology Initiative will fund research at
universities and national laboratories, efforts to develop new technology for measuring
emissions, and demonstration projects for new technologies.
On February 14, 2002, President Bush released his administration’s long-awaited
alternative to the Kyoto Protocol, the Global Climate Change Policy Book. (White
House 2002) In his remarks (Bush 2002), the President reaffirmed his commitment to the
goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at safe levels. But, importantly, the
“immediate goal” of the new global climate change initiative would not be reducing
emissions but rather reducing emissions per unit of economic activity, or reducing
“emissions intensity.” The goal is to reduce emissions intensity by 18 percent by 2012.
The rationale for this shift in emphasis in near-term goals is that the nation’s economy
must continue to grow. In facing global climate change, the President asserts, “[g]rowth
is the solution, not the problem,” because economic growth allows increased investments
in clean energy technologies and conservation. Through 2012, the President’s initiative
emphasizes research, tax incentives, and other voluntary measures to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. The President’s initiative cautions, however, that if by 2012 the nation
has not reduced greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently, additional market-based programs
may be necessary.
The major elements of the President’s initiative are grouped into three categories:
domestic initiatives, new and expanded international policies, and enhanced science and
technology.
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Domestic Initiatives
$4.6 billion in tax incentives for clean energy for fiscal year 2003 through fiscal
year 2008;
challenges to business and industry to voluntarily reduce greenhouse gas
emissions;
programs to develop more fuel-efficient motor vehicles, to produce cleaner fuels,
and to reform the Corporate Average Fuel Economy program;
a ten-year commitment to increase carbon sequestration in agriculture, including
removing environmentally sensitive cropland from cultivation, improving
cropping and grazing methods, converting cropland on wetlands to grassland or
forest, and improved forestry on nonindustrial, private forest land.
New and Expanded International Policies
increased funding for “Debt-For-Nature” programs involving forests in
developing countries;
$25 million for climate observation systems in developing countries
expanded funding for climate-related technology transfer to developing countries,
including full funding for the Global Environmental Facility and $155 million in
fiscal year 2003 for USAID climate change programs;
joint climate change research with Japan, Italy, and Central American countries.
Enhanced Science and Technology
funding for basic research on climate change and for research to develop
“breakthrough technologies” in clean energy and enhanced carbon sequestration,
including funding for the Climate Change Research Initiative and the National
Climate Change Technology Initiative.

5. Potential Impacts of the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the National
Energy Policy Group’s Plan, and President Bush’s Global Climate Change
Policy on West Virginia
The Kyoto Protocol included a U.S. commitment to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to 93 percent of 1990 levels for the period 2008 to 2012. As the U.S. economy
continued to grow from 1990 to the present and can be expected to grow from today
through 2012, the commitment is actually for a reduction substantially larger than 7
percent. Meeting such a commitment would require incurring substantial costs to convert
economic activity to less carbon-intensive activities. Carbon intensity is central to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions because carbon-dioxide is the most important of the
greenhouse gases. We emit carbon-dioxide into the atmosphere primarily by burning
fossil fuels, mostly in generating electricity and in operating motor vehicles.
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The U.S. could meet the Kyoto Protocol’s commitments for substantially reduced
emissions by some combination of the following activities, among others:
buying emissions reductions units through the emissions trading process;
investing in emissions reductions in developing countries though the Clean
Development Mechanism;
investing in emissions reductions in developed countries though the Joint
Implementation Mechanism;
retiring power plants and other facilities with high emissions;
installing equipment to reduce emissions by existing power plants and other
facilities;
switching to fuels with lower carbon emissions, such as natural gas;
investing in new power production facilities based on wind, water, or solar power;
investing in research and development to promote technological changes resulting
in lower emissions;
switching to motor vehicles with lower emissions;
creating new taxes on carbon emissions.
See, e.g., Chandler, 2001, for a discussion of emissions associated with alternatives for
electricity generation. See Gummer and Moreland, 2001, for a discussion of methods
adopted in Europe to reduce emissions. Actions to implement these reductions could
have substantial effects on the U.S. economy, including reducing GDP, shifting income
from the U.S. to other countries, and reducing economic growth.
Many groups of economists have tried to measure the potential impacts of the
Kyoto Protocol on the world economy and on the U.S. economy. A few researchers have
estimated these economic impacts at the state level, including at least two for West
Virginia. Weyant and Hill (1999) summarize the results for 13 models of the economic
impacts of the Kyoto Protocol. WEFA (1998) discusses and estimates the size of the
economic impacts for the nation and also for each of the states, while Greenstreet (1999)
performs this analysis for West Virginia. WEFA (1998, p. 37) estimates that achieving
the Kyoto Protocol’s targets through domestic actions only (i.e., without emissions
trading, joint implementation, or the clean development mechanism) would cost West
Virginia about 3.5 percent of its Gross State Product (GSP) by 2010. Greenstreet (1999,
Table 3) estimates an 8 percent of West Virginia’s Gross State Product (GSP) by 2010.
These studies, of course, modeled the effects of the Kyoto Protocol as it stood a few years
ago, before the recent changes, including the U.S. withdrawal.
In 1998, The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) produced a major
study of the economic impacts of the Kyoto Protocol, with emphasis on the effects on
energy prices, energy use, and gross domestic product (GDP). (Energy Information
Administration, 1998) The EIA study examined a reference case and six other emissions
reduction scenarios. The reference case had average U.S. greenhouse gas emissions for
the period 2008 to 2012 at 33 percent above 1990 levels, which is the expectation for the
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situation with no enforced emissions reductions. The six emissions reductions scenarios
are for emissions 24 percent above 1990 emissions levels, 14 percent above 1990 levels,
9 percent above 1990 levels, emissions at 1990 levels, 3 percent below 1990 emissions
levels, and 7 percent below 1990 emissions levels.
To achieve reductions in the EIA model, the EIA applies a carbon price to the
price of each energy fuel. The EIA model is the National Energy Modeling System,
which projects energy production, consumption, imports, and prices based on
assumptions about various macroeconomic variables, demographics, world energy
markets, and other variables. For the year 2010, the EIA projects that the total cost to the
U.S. in 1992 dollars for the six energy reduction scenarios would range from $109 billion
for the 24 percent above 1990 emissions levels scenario to $283 billion for the 7 percent
below 1990 emissions levels scenario. Both of these calculations are based on the
assumption that the additional revenue from the carbon tax (or carbon permit auction) is
returned to households through a cut in personal income taxes. Most of the reductions in
emissions in the EIA scenarios results from reductions in carbon emissions from
electricity generation. Most of these reductions come from fuel switching in electricity
generation, with coal-fired generation replaced with electricity generation from natural
gas and renewables, especially biomass and wind power.
The main potential for impacts of climate change policies on the West Virginia
economy arise from the potential impacts on the overall level of economic activity in the
U.S. as measured by Gross Domestic Product, on the demand for coal for electricity
generation, on the price of electricity, and on the price of coal. Full implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol as originally written would lead to substantial reductions in GDP,
substantial reductions in the demand for coal for electricity generation, substantial
increases in the price of electricity, and substantial decreases in the price of coal. The
Bonn and Marrakech agreements implementing the Kyoto Protocol have substantially
weakened the Protocol and thereby lessened any potential impacts. Perhaps more
importantly, the United States has stated that it will not implement the Protocol, and the
U.S. had only minimal participation in the Bonn and Marrakech meetings. It would be
reasonable to ask what the impact would be of the current version of the Protocol as
modified in Bonn and Marrakech.
Finally, the most important question concerning the impact of climate change
policy on West Virginia is to ask what will be the impact of the Bush Administration’s
Kyoto follow-up policies on West Virginia. The U.S. will not implement the Kyoto
Protocol as originally written or subsequently modified, but it will pursue climate change
policies. While other countries’ implementation of the modified Kyoto Protocol may
have some impacts on West Virginia, it is these domestic U.S. policies that will have the
greatest effects here.
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A. Estimating the Economic Impacts
Our method here will be to use the REMI model to estimate potential impacts of
the Kyoto Protocol on the West Virginia economy. (Greenstreet (1999) used an earlier
version of the REMI model in his study of the effects of the Kyoto Protocol on West
Virginia.) The REMI model is a structural model of the U.S. economy which can be
disaggregated to state or regional levels. By structural we mean that the model uses
mathematical equations to represent the causal relationships among the variables. For
example, an industry’s output is related to the inputs of labor, intermediate goods, capital,
and other inputs it uses in production. Also, migration of people into a region would
increase labor supply which would reduce the region’s wage rates. The REMI model
simultaneously determines values for hundreds of variables, including output by industry,
labor demand, capital demand, wages, prices, profits, labor supply, and population. The
REMI model is internally consistent in that it enforces all of the relationships among its
variables simultaneously. The model is also dynamic, which means that it incorporates
changes in the variables over time. Changes in the economy may be felt over many
years, and the model shows these changes through time. See REMI (2000, pp. 6-11) for
an overview of the model.
Using the REMI model begins with a baseline forecast of economic variables
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employment, and many other variables of
interest. Here, we will use REMI’s default “Control Forecast” to generate our baseline
forecast. This forecast covers the period 2000 through 2025 based on actual data through
1999. We will then replace values of policy variables likely to be affected by various
implementations of the Kyoto Protocol or U.S. federal energy and environmental
policies. We then use the REMI model to calculate alternative forecasts based on these
new values of the policy variables. The difference between the baseline forecast and
each alternative forecast is the estimated impact of the implementation of the Protocol or
federal policy.
The process of converting from a description of the Kyoto Protocol
implementation or a description of a federal policy to values of policy variables that can
be inserted into the REMI model is known as developing a “scenario.” This can be a
difficult process requiring exercise of judgment by the researcher. It involves
determining which key variables may be directly affected by the policy change and then
making a judgment about the magnitude of the change. In some cases, our task is made
much easier by the extensive work of others on these scenarios.
B. Potential Impacts of the NEPD Energy Plan on West Virginia
The May 2001 Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group
includes many policy recommendations that would affect the West Virginia economy.
The Center for Data Analysis of the Heritage Foundation (2001) has published an
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extensive analysis of the impact of the NEP Report’s U.S. national energy plan on the
U.S. economy. (Center for Data Analysis of the Heritage Foundation, 2001) The study
is based on econometric analysis of the plan conducted by DRI/WEFA, one of the
nation’s leading economic consulting firms. We can enter some of the forecast effects of
the national energy plan on the U.S. economy, including effects on GDP and effects on
energy markets, into the REMI model to calculate impacts for West Virginia.
The CDA study describes the overall impact of the NEP energy plan as follows:
Greater energy efficiency, lower energy prices, and increased energy
independence would promote economic growth and create over 1.5
million job opportunities. The disposable income (adjusted for inflation)
for a family of four would increase by over $1,800 … (CDA, p. 7)
The CDA study forecasts an average annual increase in the rate of economic growth of
the U.S. economy of 0.1 percentage point, resulting in an increase in real GDP for the
year 2025 of $540 billion.
The CDA study also reports, among other results, the following major national
impacts in specific energy markets:
•

electricity consumption will grow by 64 percent from 2005 through 2030, which
would put electricity consumption 3.5 percent below the level forecast under
current policies;

•

coal production will increase by about 36 percent from 2005 through 2030.
Initially, the forecast of coal production is above the level forecast under current
policies, but it is almost 10 percent below the current-policy level by 2030. The
chart below shows forecast coal production in quadrillion BTUs for the period
2005 through 2030:
year
current policies
NEPG plan

•

2005
24.09
24.74

2010
25.68
26.05

2015
27.73
27.15

2020
31.02
29.01

2025
34.23
31.14

2030
37.30
33.63

average coal mine-mouth prices will increase by about 36 percent from 2005
through 2030. The chart below shows forecast mine-mouth prices in year 2000
dollars per million BTUs for the period 2005 through 2030:
year
current policies
NEPG plan

2005
0.754
0.754

2010
0.742
0.738

2015
0.710
0.706

2020
0.673
0.668

2025
0.651
0.646

2030
0.622
0.616
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residential retail electricity prices will be 2.6 percent below the level forecast
under current policies by 2030.

Because of the changes shown above, the NEP plan could have important effects
on West Virginia during the period 2005 through 2030, and these effects could change
over time. The CDA study estimates the impacts of the national energy plan on measures
of economic activity for the U.S. economy as a whole and for individual energy markets.
We can use some of these estimates of impacts for the national energy plan to calculate
values of policy variables to be input into the REMI model. Comparison with REMI’s
baseline scenario will show impact of the NEP plan on the West Virginia economy. As
REMI forecasts only out to 2025, we will not use the CDA forecasts beyond that date.
We incorporate the CDA’s forecast GDP changes (CDA, 2001, p. 93) into the
REMI baseline forecast by increasing the REMI baseline forecast by the CDA study’s
percentage increase relative to its “by-the-book” case. For the years between 2000 and
2025 for which the CDA study does not show a forecast (i.e., 2000-2004, 2006-2009,
2011-2019, and 2021-2024), we interpolate between the forecast years assuming a
constant rate of growth.
The table below shows the CDA’s forecasts of changes in three important energy
market variables resulting from the national energy plan:
Selected CDA Energy Variable Forecasts for the NEP Scenario
[Source: CDA (2001), pp. 79, 83]
variable
U.S. coal production
Commercial electricity prices
Industrial electricity prices

2005
+2.7%
–1.1%
–1.7%

2010
+1.4%
–1.8%
–2.8%

2015
–2.1%
–1.8%
–3.0%

2020
–6.5%
–2.8%
–4.7%

2025
–9.0%
–2.7%
–4.5%

Following Greenstreet (1999), we convert these values into REMI policy variables in the
following way. Coal mining is 84.5% of mining in West Virginia. (U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (2001b).) Assuming other types of mining are
not directly affected by greenhouse gas emissions policies, we apply the reductions
shown in the first row of the table above to 84.5% of West Virginia mining; that is, we
increase West Virginia mining by 0.845*2.7=2.3% in 2005 and by 0.845*1.4=1.2% in
2010. We decrease West Virginia mining by 0.845*2.1=1.8% in 2015, by
0.845*6.5=5.5% in 2020, and by 0.845*9.0=7.6% in 2025. For the intervening years we
use a linear interpolation.
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We also incorporate CDA’s commercial and industrial electricity price changes
into the NEP scenario as shown in the following table:
Changes in Electricity Price Variables for the NEP Scenario
variable
Commercial electricity prices
Industrial electricity prices

2005-09
–1.1%
–1.7%

2010-14
–1.8%
–2.8%

2015-19
–1.8%
–3.0%

2020-24
–2.8%
–4.7%

2025
–2.7%
–4.5%

As described above, the NEP scenario increases the nation’s GDP, first increases
and later reduces West Virginia’s mining output, and reduces electricity prices. The
REMI model predicts that by 2010 the results of these changes for West Virginia relative
to the baseline forecast are an annual gain of real Gross State Product of $196 million and
a gain of total employment of 4,400. Real output across a wide range of sectors of the
West Virginia economy are also higher. In the earlier years, mining output and
employment are higher with the NEP scenario, but they are moderately lower by 2015
and beyond. The NEP scenario raises real gross state product and total employment over
the entire period.
The table below shows details of the projected impacts:
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Estimated Impacts of the NEP Scenario on the West Virginia Economy 2005-2025
2005
variable
Gross State Product (billion chained ‘92 $)
Employment
Personal Income (billion fixed ‘92 $)

level
0.170
2,790
0.092

2010

%
0.47%
0.30%
0.21%

Output by sector (billion fixed ‘92 $)
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

0.187
0.029
0.021
0.013
0.018

3.27%
0.85%
0.26%
0.21%
0.16%

Employment by sector
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

810
440
130
340
530

3.26%
0.85%
0.28%
0.21%
0.18%

2020

level
0.196
4,420
0.060
0.095
0.024
0.041
0.032
0.058
360
340
200
750
1,420

2015

%
0.54%
0.48%
0.13%

level
0.123
3,370
0.005

%
0.32%
0.37%
0.01%

1.64%
0.70%
0.45%
0.48%
0.47%

–0.107
–0.007
0.049
0.026
0.065

–1.72%
–0.19%
0.48%
0.37%
0.53%

1.62%
0.69%
0.45%
0.46%
0.46%

–370
–100
200
540
1,580

–1.76%
–0.21%
0.45%
0.34%
0.49%

2025

Gross State Product (billion chained ‘92 $)
Employment
Personal Income (billion fixed ‘92 $)

level
0.148
5,350
–0.025

Output by sector (billion fixed ‘92 $)
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

–0.389
–0.021
0.096
0.045
0.137

–5.78
–0.58
0.87
0.61
0.97

–0.502
0.027
0.307
0.163
0.425

–6.88
0.77
2.59
2.15
2.85

Employment by sector
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

–1,200
–280
340
880
3,010

–5.85%
–0.61%
0.79%
0.57%
0.90%

–1,400
300
1,000
3,020
9,310

–7.02%
0.69%
2.45%
2.05%
2.71%

variable

%
level
0.36%
0.793
0.58% 19,840
–0.05% 0.168

%
1.83%
2.16%
0.30%
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Thus, we see that the NEP scenario has small positive impacts on the West
Virginia economy. The direct impacts result from increases in West Virginia mining
output and U.S. GDP and decreases in electricity prices. These impacts are spread
throughout West Virginia’s economy as sales of intermediate products and services
increase and as employment and incomes rise. As a result, there are also positive effects
on construction, services, retail trade, and other sectors. The result by 2010 is about a
one-half of one percent increase in West Virginia’s gross state product and total
employment.

C. Potential Impacts on West Virginia of the NEPD Energy Plan Including
Additional Spending
The previous scenario examined the potential impacts on the West Virginia
economy of CDA’s projected changes in U.S. GDP, coal production, and electricity
prices resulting from the NEPD Group Report. The NEPD Group Report also includes
recommendations on federal spending that would affect the West Virginia economy.
CDA’s projections included the effects of proposed increased federal spending on the
Low Income Heating Assistance Program (LIHEAP). (CDA, p. 19) The NEPD Group
Report includes a recommendation for $2 billion over ten years in additional spending on
research on clean coal technology. CDA’s projections include an anticipated effect of
this spending on the efficiency of new coal-fired electricity generating units, but it does
not include the effects of the spending itself. (CDA, pp. 44, 54) This makes sense in
estimating the impact of the program on the nation as a whole, because the additional
spending on clean coal technology may come at the expense of reduced federal spending
on other programs or through increased tax collections. The result is that for the nation
as a whole the spending on the clean coal program may have little effect except through
increased energy efficiency.
The results of the federal spending itself for West Virginia, however, could be
important. Because West Virginia has a larger than average share of its economic
activity in coal production and coal-fired electricity generation, we can reasonably expect
West Virginia to get a larger than average share of federal spending on clean coal
technology research. To account for this effect, we have created an additional scenario
which augments the previous NEP scenario by adding the potential effect of the federal
spending on clean coal technology. According to the REMI database, in 1999 West
Virginia accounted for 14.9 percent of U.S. coal production. To estimate the effect of the
additional spending, we assume that West Virginia will get 14.9 percent of the $2 billion
over ten years, or $29.8 million per year. To implement this change, we increase federal
civilian spending in West Virginia by $29.8 million each year. We put $9.8 million into
increased spending on structures and $20 million into increased spending on durables,
non-durables, and services.
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The result of this increased spending is to add to the NEP’s small positive impacts
on the West Virginia economy. The table below shows the increases in gross state
product, employment, and personal income owing to the additional spending over the
previous scenario, which is the NEP without the increased spending.
Estimated Impacts on the West Virginia Economy of the Additional Federal
Spending in the NEP Scenario, 2005-2025
2005
variable
Gross State Product (billion chained ‘92 $)
Employment
Personal Income (billion fixed ‘92 $)

level
0.013
450
0.009

%
0.04%
0.05%
0.02%

2020
variable
Gross State Product (billion chained ‘92 $)
Employment
Personal Income (billion fixed ‘92 $)

level
0.000
10
0.002

%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

2010
level
0.010
340
0.010

%
0.03%
0.04%
0.02%

2015
level
–0.002
–50
0.002

2025
level
0.001
40
0.003

%
0.00%
0.00%
0.01%

These results show that the NEP with the additional spending on clean coal
technology has slightly larger impacts on West Virginia than the NEP scenario without
the increased spending. The table below shows details of the total impacts:

%
–0.01%
–0.01%
0.00%
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Estimated Impacts of the NEP Scenario with Additional Spending on the West
Virginia Economy 2005-2025
2005
variable
Gross State Product (billion chained ‘92 $)
Employment
Personal Income (billion fixed ‘92 $)

level
0.183
3,240
0.102

2010

%
0.51%
0.35%
0.24%

Output by sector (billion fixed ‘92 $)
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

0.188
0.039
0.024
0.015
0.024

3.28%
1.13%
0.28%
0.25%
0.22%

Employment by sector
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

820
580
150
410
710

3.27%
1.13%
0.32%
0.25%
0.24%

2020

level
0.205
4,760
0.069
0.095
0.032
0.043
0.033
0.063
360
450
210
800
1,550

2015

%
0.56%
0.52%
0.15%

level
0.121
3,320
0.006

%
0.31%
0.36%
0.01%

1.65%
0.92%
0.47%
0.51%
0.51%

–0.107
–0.008
0.048
0.025
0.070

–1.73%
–0.22%
0.47%
0.36%
0.52%

1.63%
0.92%
0.47%
0.49%
0.50%

–370
–120
190
530
1,550

–1.77%
–0.25%
0.44%
0.33%
0.48%

2025

Gross State Product (billion chained ‘92 $)
Employment
Personal Income (billion fixed ‘92 $)

level
0.148
5,360
–0.023

Output by sector (billion fixed ‘92 $)
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

–0.389
–0.021
0.096
0.045
0.137

–5.79
–0.59
0.87
0.61
0.97

–0.502
0.027
0.307
0.164
0.425

–6.88
0.76
2.59
2.15
2.85

Employment by sector
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

–1,200
–290
340
880
3,010

–5.85%
–0.62%
0.80%
0.57%
0.90%

–1,400
300
1,000
3,030
9,330

–7.02%
0.68%
2.45%
2.06%
2.71%

variable

%
level
0.36%
0.795
0.58% 19,880
–0.04% 0.170

%
1.83%
2.16%
0.30%
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The basic result for the NEP scenario with the additional spending is the same as
for the scenario without the additional spending―the NEP has small positive impacts on
the West Virginia economy. The direct impacts result from increases in West Virginia
mining output, increases in federal spending in West Virginia, increases in U.S. GDP,
and decreases in electricity prices. These impacts are spread throughout West Virginia’s
economy through increases in sales of intermediate products and services and increases in
employment and incomes. The result by 2010 is about a one-half of one percent increase
in West Virginia’s gross state product and total employment.
The figures below illustrate the effects of the NEP scenario with the additional
spending on West Virginia’s total employment and gross state product. They show the
time paths of these variables for the baseline forecast and the NEP with the additional
spending forecast over the period 1999 to 2025. For each variable, the gap between these
two paths is the positive impact shown in the charts above.

WV Real Gross State Product 2000–2025, REMI Baseline and NEP with Additional
Spending Scenarios
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West Virginia Employment, 2000 to 2025, REMI Baseline and NEP with Additional
Spending Scenarios

Employment (tousands)
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600

D. Potential Impacts of President Bush’s Global Climate Change Policies on West
Virginia
One of the best examples of scenario development in this area is the Energy
Information Administration’s 1998 study of the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on the
U.S. economy [Energy Information Administration (1998)]. This very extensive and
detailed study estimated the impacts of various policy regimes on supply and demand in
U.S. energy markets and on U.S. macroeconomic variables. The EIA study included,
among others, policy scenarios for U.S. carbon emissions levels at 1990 levels plus 14
percent and 1990 levels plus 24 percent. (The first of these scenarios formed the basis for
the forecasts for the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on the West Virginia economy in
Greenstreet (1999).)
The second of these scenarios is interesting in light of the Bush administration’s
decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol and to substitute the alternative
approach to controlling greenhouse gas emissions described earlier. The EIA’s baseline
scenario, which it refers to as the “reference case” is the scenario having no enforced
emissions reductions, resulting in emissions at 1990 levels plus 33 percent. (EIA, p. 10)
Among the policy scenarios the EIA considers, the 1990+24% scenario is the least
stringent scenario with enforced emissions reductions. According to the EIA, the
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1990+24% scenario would result in average carbon emissions reductions over the period
2008 to 2012 of 122 million metric tons. (EIA, p. 20) This amounts to total emissions
reductions over the five-year period of 610 million metric tons. The Bush plan, on the
other hand, would “achieve 100 million metric tons of reduced emissions in 2012 alone,
with more than 500 million metric tons in cumulative savings over the entire decade.”
(White House 2002, p. 5) Comparing the 610 million metric ton reduction over five
years under the 1990+24% scenario to the more than 500 million metric ton reduction
over ten years, we see that the Bush plan is approximately one-half as stringent as the
1990+24% scenario. Thus, the EIA’s 1990+24% scenario gives us a scenario with precalculated, detailed impacts on energy markets and macroeconomic variables and a
known relationship to the Bush administration’s plan. We can expect that the impact of
the Bush plan would be less than one-half of the impact calculated for the 1990+24%
scenario. The effect would be substantially less than one-half if the economic impacts
are non-linearly related to the emissions reductions.
The Impact of the Kyoto Protocol 1990+24% Scenario on the West Virginia Economy
The Energy Information Administration’s 1998 study estimates the impacts of
various Kyoto Protocol emissions reduction scenarios on a wide range of measures of
economic activity for the U.S. economy as a whole and for various individual energy
markets. We can use some of these estimates of impacts for the 1990+24% scenario to
calculate values of policy variables to be input into the REMI model. Comparison with
REMI’s baseline scenario will show impact of the 1990+24% scenario on the West
Virginia economy.
The EIA estimates that the 1990+24% scenario would result in a 0.1% reduction
in gross domestic product (GDP) by 2005, a 1.0% reduction in GDP by 2010 and a 0.5%
reduction by 2020. (EIA, 1998, Table B20, pp. 210-211) We incorporate the GDP
forecast change into the REMI baseline forecast by reducing the REMI baseline forecast
by the EIA’s percentage reduction relative to its reference case. For the years between
2000 and 2020 for which EIA does not show a forecast (i.e., 2000-2004, 2006-2009, and
2011-2019), we interpolate between the forecast years assuming a constant rate of
growth.
The table below shows the EIA forecasts of changes in two important energy
market variables resulting from the 1990+24% scenario:
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EIA Coal Market Forecasts for the 1990+24% Scenario
[Source: EIA (1998), Table B16, pp. 202-203; Table B8, pp. 184-185]
variable
Appalachia coal production
Electricity generation from coal

2005
–3.0%
–3.5%

2010
–16.3%
–17.6%

2020
–15.9%
–40.7%

Following Greenstreet (1999), we convert these values into REMI policy variables in the
following way. Coal mining is 84.5% of mining in West Virginia. (U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (2001b).) Assuming other types of mining are
not directly affected by greenhouse gas emissions policies, we apply the reductions
shown in the first row of the table above to 84.5% of West Virginia mining; that is, we
reduce West Virginia mining by 0.845*3.0=2.5% in 2005, 0.845*16.3=13.8% in 2010,
and 0.845*15.9=13.5% in 2020. For the intervening years we use a linear interpolation.
In a similar manner, we convert the impact on electricity generation from coal
into public utility sales by using Greenstreet’s assumption that in West Virginia 80% of
public utility sales is sales of electricity from coal-fired plants. (The remainder would be
such things as water, sewer, and the like.) Thus, in the policy forecast we reduce West
Virginia public utility sales by 0.80*3.5=2.8% in 2005, 0.80*17.6=14.1% in 2010, and
0.80*40.7=32.5% in 2020. For the intervening years we use a linear interpolation.
We further assume that the 1990+24% scenario will remove much of West
Virginia’s price advantage in electricity production and sales. The REMI data show that
for 1999 commercial electricity prices in West Virginia were 68.9% of the national
average price. The REMI data also show that for 1999 industrial electricity prices in
West Virginia were 68.9% of the national average price. REMI also shows household
operating costs at 76% of the national average. We assume that both commercial and
industrial electricity prices along with household operating costs in West Virginia will
rise to 80% of the national averages by 2010 and remain at the national averages through
2020. For commercial electricity costs this is an increase of 16.1% ([80/68.9]–1) and for
industrial electricity costs this is an increase of 17.5%. For household operating costs this
is a 5.3% increase. We impose these increases on these variables in the REMI data
beginning with zero increase in 2004 and increasing the percentage linearly to 16.1% for
commercial electricity costs, 17.5% for industrial electricity costs by 2010, and 5.3% for
household operating costs. These costs then remain constant from 2011 through 2020.
As described above, the 1990+24% scenario reduces the nation’s GDP, reduces
West Virginia mining output and public utility sales, and reduces West Virginia’s
electricity price advantage relative to the rest of the U.S. The REMI model predicts that
by 2010 the results of these changes for West Virginia relative to the baseline forecast are
an annual loss of real Gross State Product of $1.674 billion and a loss of total
employment of 30,370. The predicted impact by 2010 on real personal income is a loss
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of just under $1 billion. Real output across a wide range of sectors of the West Virginia
economy also falls.
The table below shows details of the projected impacts:
Estimated Impacts of the 1990+24% Scenario on the West Virginia Economy
2005

2010

2020

Gross State Product (billion chained ‘92 $)
Employment
Personal Income (billion fixed ‘92 $)

level
–0.298
–6,196
–0.158

%
–0.8%
–0.7%
–0.4%

level
–1.674
–30,370
–0.975

%
level
–4.6%
–2.405
–3.3% –35,320
–2.1%
–1.396

%
–5.8%
–3.8%
–2.7%

Output by sector (billion fixed ‘92 $)
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

–0.191
–0.082
–0.149
–0.044
–0.053

–3.3%
–2.4%
–1.8%
–0.7%
–0.5%

–1.107
–0.330
–0.796
–0.206
–0.270

–19.2%
–9.6%
–8.7%
–3.1%
–2.2%

–1.351
–0.380
–1.855
–0.275
–0.348

–20.1%
–10.6%
–16.8%
–3.7%
–2.4%

Employment by sector
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

–833
–1,214
–509
–1,162
–1,488

–3.3%
–2.3%
–1.1%
–0.7%
–0.5%

–4,287
–4,687
–2,576
–4,928
–7,120

–19.2%
–9.6%
–5.7%
–3.0%
–2.3%

–4,108
–4,880
–4,690
–5,246
–8,242

–20.1%
–10.6%
–11.0%
–3.4%
–2.5%

variable

The Kyoto Protocol 1990+24% scenario has large negative impacts on the West
Virginia economy. While the direct impacts occur in mining output and public utility
sales, these impacts are spread throughout the state’s economy as sales of intermediate
products and services decline and as employment and incomes fall. Thus, there are large
negative effects on construction, services, retail trade, and other sectors. The negative
effects generally grow over time as the use of coal in electricity generation declines and
the dynamic effects of the model are felt.
The figures below illustrate the effects on employment and gross state product.
They show the time paths of these variables for the baseline forecast and the 1990+24%
forecast over the period 2000 to 2020. For each variable, the gap between these two
paths is the negative impact shown in the charts above.
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WV Real Gross State Product 2000–2020, REMI Baseline and 1990+24% Scenarios
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The 1990+24% scenario is much less stringent than the original Kyoto Protocol
commitment of a reduction of emissions to 1990 levels minus 7%. Nevertheless, the
1990+24% scenario would entail substantial losses for West Virginia. The REMI model
predicts that by 2010 there would be an annual loss of real GSP of $1.674 billion, a loss
of total employment of 30,370, and a loss in real personal income of almost $1 billion.
The U.S. will not implement any version of the Kyoto Protocol, but it will pursue
policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Bush administration’s plan announced
in February 2002 would require reductions in carbon emissions at about one-half the
level required in the 1990+24% scenario. Thus, the negative impacts of this plan will be
one-half or less of the impacts shown above for the 1990+24% scenario. They could be
substantially less. Additional work on potential impacts of U.S. federal policies remains
to be done.

E. Potential Impacts on West Virginia of the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
without U.S. Participation
The United States has indicated that it will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. It will
not reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to a level seven percent below its 1990 emissions
levels. Nevertheless, as described in section 2 above, much of the rest of the world will
be implementing a weakened version of the Protocol. Even though the U.S. will not be
participating directly, actions of other countries could have effects on world energy
markets and thereby on the U.S. and on West Virginia.
One market segment expected to be adversely affected by the Kyoto Protocol is
coal exports to Europe. European nations have been and will continue to shift away from
coal use:
On environmental grounds several EU countries have taken an
increasingly dim view of coal as a major fuel source for electricity
generation. Several countries including Denmark, Finland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, have imposed levies such as
carbon and energy taxes that reduce the cost competitiveness of coalfired power plants, thereby … reducing overall coal consumption. …
While emissions targets and climate-change philosophies differ within
the EU, the overriding sentiment is one that opposes coal—certainly
for new power plant construction and largely for existing facilities.
(Ewart, 2001)
(See also Haites, et al., for discussions of emissions reductions policies in Denmark,
Norway, and other countries.)
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The result is that it is reasonable to expect European coal consumption and coal imports
to decline as European nations continue to implement the Kyoto Protocol. According to
the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook 2002, U.S. “[c]oal
exports are projected to decline slightly through 2020, as European demand for imports
declines as a result of environmental concerns and competition from other producers.”
(EIA, 2002, p. 6)
We model the impact of Europe’s implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on West
Virginia by making two alternative assumptions about reductions in West Virginia’s coal
exports to Europe. In the first of these scenarios, we assume that West Virginia’s coal
exports to the European countries in the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex I will decline by 10
percent. We assume the exports will begin to decline from REMI’s forecast 2004 level in
2005 and by 2008, and thereafter, the decline will be 10 percent. We implement this
scenario in the REMI model by reducing West Virginia’s mining output by 10 percent of
the total coal sales to the European Annex I countries. In the second of these scenarios,
we assume the decline will be 50 percent.
The REMI model predicts that by 2010 the impacts of the Europe–10% scenario
for West Virginia relative to the baseline forecast are a small annual loss of real Gross
State Product of $12 million and a loss of 200 jobs. Real output across the range of
sectors of the West Virginia economy also falls slightly.
The table below shows the REMI model’s forecasts of the decreases in gross state
product, employment, and personal income owing to the ten percent decline in coal
exports to Europe:
Estimated Impacts of the Europe–10% Scenario on the West Virginia Economy
2005
variable
Gross State Product (billion chained ‘92 $)
Employment
Personal Income (billion fixed ‘92 $)

level
–0.003
–60
–0.002

%
–0.0%
–0.0%
–0.0%

2010
level
–0.012
–200
–0.007

2020

%
level
–0.0%
–0.010
–0.0% –150
–0.0% –0.007

The second of the Kyoto-without-the-U.S. scenarios, with a decline in West
Virginia’s mining output of 50 percent of the total coal sales to the European Annex I
countries, has more serious consequences for the West Virginia economy. The impacts,
however, are still relatively small. The REMI model predicts that by 2010 the impacts of
the Europe–50% scenario for West Virginia relative to the baseline forecast are an annual
loss of real Gross State Product of $60 million and an employment loss of 1,020. Real
output across a wide range of sectors of the West Virginia economy also falls.

%
–0.0%
–0.0%
–0.0%
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The table below shows the REMI model’s forecasts of the decreases in gross state
product, employment, and personal income resulting from the 50 percent decline in coal
exports to the European Annex I countries:
Estimated Impacts of the Europe–50% Scenario on the West Virginia Economy
2005
Gross State Product (billion chained ‘92 $)
Employment
Personal Income (billion fixed ‘92 $)

level
–0.017
–310
–0.009

%
–0.0%
–0.0%
–0.0%

Output by sector (billion fixed ‘92 $)
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

–0.020
–0.004
–0.002
–0.002
–0.002

–0.4%
–0.1%
–0.0%
–0.0%
–0.0%

Employment by sector
mining
construction
transportation and public utilities
retail trade
services

–90
–60
–10
–50
–60

–0.4%
–0.1%
–0.0%
–0.0%
–0.0%

variable

2010
level
–0.060
–1,020
–0.037

2020

%
–0.2%
–0.1%
–0.1%

level
–0.052
–740
–0.037

%
–0.1%
–0.1%
–0.1%

–0.080
–0.012
–0.006
–0.006
–0.006

–1.4%
–0.3%
–0.1%
–0.1%
–0.1%

–0.079
–0.005
–0.005
–0.005
–0.006

–1.2%
–0.1%
–0.0%
–0.1%
–0.0%

–310
–160
–30
–150
–170

–1.4%
–0.3%
–0.1%
–0.1%
–0.1%

–240
–60
–20
–100
–140

–1.2%
–0.1%
–0.0%
–0.1%
–0.0%

These results show that continued implementation of the Protocol in Europe may
have only very limited impacts on the West Virginia economy. The impacts of the loss
of coal exports to Europe are very small unless the percentage loss in exports is large.
Even at a loss of 50% of European exports, the losses of output and employment are
moderate in the coal industry and small in other sectors of the West Virginia economy.
Thus, it appears that the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol has shielded the
West Virginia economy from the potentially severe losses in employment, output, and
income that the Protocol could have implied.
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Conclusion

West Virginia’s economy is more concentrated than the economies of most states
in the production and use of energy. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol, the May 2001 report of
the National Energy Policy Development Group, and the policies outlined in the Bush
Administration’s February 2002 Global Climate Change Policy Book could have
substantial and wide-ranging impacts on West Virginia’s coal and electricity industries
and other parts of the West Virginia economy. We find that in some cases the potential
effects of the policies outlined in these initiatives are large because of potential impacts
on U.S. gross domestic product and potential impacts on the use of coal in electricity
generation.
We use the REMI model to estimate potential impacts of these policies on the
West Virginia economy. The REMI model is a structural model of the U.S. economy
which can be disaggregated to state or regional levels. We use REMI’s default “Control
Forecast” of economic variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employment,
and many other variables to generate our baseline forecast. This baseline forecast covers
the period 2000 through 2025 based on actual data through 1999. We then replace values
of policy variables likely to be affected by the Kyoto Protocol or U.S. federal energy and
environmental policies and calculate alternative forecasts based on these new values of
the policy variables. The difference between the baseline forecast and each alternative
forecast is the estimated impact of the implementation of the Protocol or federal policy.
We use results from an extensive analysis of the impact of the NEP on the U.S.
economy from the Center for Data Analysis of the Heritage Foundation (2001) in the
REMI model to calculate impacts for West Virginia. We model two NEP scenarios, one
with additional federal clean coal technology spending in West Virginia, and one without
such additional spending. The basic result for the NEP scenario with the additional
spending is the same as for the scenario without the additional spending―the NEP has
small positive impacts on the West Virginia economy. The direct impacts result from
increases in West Virginia mining output, increases in federal spending in West Virginia,
increases in U.S. GDP, and decreases in electricity prices. These impacts are spread
throughout West Virginia’s economy through increases in sales of intermediate products
and services and increases in employment and incomes. The result by 2010 is about a
one-half of one percent increase in West Virginia’s gross state product and total
employment.
We determine that the Bush Administration’s climate change policies would have
small negative effects on income and production in West Virginia. The 1998 Energy
Information Administration (EIA) study of the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on the U.S.
economy estimated the impacts of various policy regimes on supply and demand in U.S.
energy markets. The EIA study included, among others, policy scenarios for U.S. carbon
emissions levels at 1990 levels plus 24 percent. This scenario is useful in estimating the
effects of the Bush administration’s alternative approach to controlling greenhouse gas
emissions. The EIA’s 1990+24% scenario is its least stringent scenario with enforced
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emissions reductions, and the Bush plan is approximately one-half as stringent as the
1990+24% scenario. Thus, the EIA’s 1990+24% scenario gives us a scenario with precalculated, detailed impacts on energy markets and macroeconomic variables and a
known relationship to the Bush administration’s plan. For West Virginia, the REMI
model predicts for the 1990+24% scenario that by 2010 there would be an annual loss of
real GSP of $1.674 billion, a loss of total employment of 30,370, and a loss in real
personal income of almost $1 billion. The Bush administration’s plan announced in
February 2002 would have negative impacts of one-half or less of the impacts for the
1990+24% scenario. They could be substantially less.
We find that the Kyoto Protocol as it currently stands is unlikely to have large
impacts on West Virginia. The U.S. will not be participating in the emissions reductions
or the mechanisms of the Protocol, and the requirements on other nations to implement
the Protocol have been substantially diluted in recent negotiations. We model the impact
of Europe’s implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on West Virginia by making two
alternative assumptions about reductions in West Virginia’s coal exports to Europe. The
first alternative assumes a 10 percent reduction in West Virginia’s coal exports to Europe,
while the second assumes a reduction of 50 percent. The impacts for the 10 percent
alternative are quite small. For West Virginia, the REMI model predicts that by 2010 the
impacts of the 50 percent reduction scenario relative to the baseline forecast are an annual
loss of real Gross State Product of $60 million and an employment loss of 1,020. Thus,
continued implementation of the Protocol in Europe may have only very limited impacts
on the West Virginia economy.
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